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FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES
IN VIRGINIA
JOSEPH E. ULRICH*
In Surratt v. Eskridge' the Virginia Supreme Court held that an insol-
vent debtor had the privilege of preferring' one creditor over another, and
that the disfavored creditor could not attack the payment as a fraudulent
conveyance. Preferences made by corporations also fall within the Surratt
rule,3 which has one well-recognized exception. In Darden v. George G. Lee
Co.' the Virginia Supreme Court held that where the controlling director
of a corporation is preferred over other creditors of the debtor, the preferen-
tial payment may be set aside as a fraudulent conveyance under section
55-80 of the Virginia Code.' In Bank of Commerce v. Rosemary & Thyme,6
decided last term, the issue was whether preferential payments made by
a corporation on-debts for which tWee directors were sureties could be chal-
lenged under section 55-80. The plaintiff asserted that the case fell within
the exception to the general rule stated in Darden. The defendant directors
argued that since the preferred creditor qualified as a bona fide purchaser
for the purposes of section 55-80, the transaction was valid. The court
accepted the defendant's position, even though it implied that the direc-
tors had engaged in wrongful conduct. Since the preferred creditor had no
knowledge of the debtor's fraud, the plaintiff failed to state a cause of
action under section 55-80.
This article has two goals. The first is to indicate the essential factual
differences between the situations presented in Darden and Bank of
Commerce, and the simple preference found in Surratt. Once this distinc-
tion is recognized, it becomes apparent that the legality of the simple
preference and the two factual situations involving corporate directors
granting themselves preferences should be judged under different legal
principles. The second goal is to demonstrate that unless Darden and Bank
of Commerce are strictly limited to their facts, the cases either overrule or
* Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University; A.B. (1959), LL.B. (1961), Washing-
ton & Lee University.
I 131 Va. 325, 108 S.E. 677 (1921).
2 As used in this article, the term "preference" is a transfer of money or property by an
insolvent debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor in payment of, or as security for, an
antecedent debt. There is no requirement that the creditor know or have reason to know of
the debtor's insolvency. Cf. Bankruptcy Act §§ 60(a), (b), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a), (b) (1976).
Beck v. Semones' Adm'r, 145 Va. 429, 134 S.E. 677 (1926).
204 Va. 108, 129 S.E.2d 897 (1963).
3 VA. CoDE § 55-80 (Repl. Vol. 1974). Section 55-80 provides in pertinent part:
Every gift, conveyance, assignment or transfer of, or charge upon, any estate, real
or personal, . . . with intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors, purchasers or
other persons of or from what they are or may be lawfully entitled to shall, as to
such creditors, purchasers or other persons, . . . be void. This section shall not
affect the title of a purchaser for valuable consideration, unless it appears that he
had notice of the fraudulent intent of his immediate grantor or of the fraud render-
ing void the title of such grantor.
4 218 Va. 781, 239 S.E.2d 909 (1978).
52 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
significantly modify Surratt and similar decisions, thereby calling into
question the validity of preferences generally. This latter change, which
appears to have been inadvertant, may have far reaching implications.
To fulfull these goals, it is necessary to indicate the essential differences
between fraudulent conveyances and preferences. With these differences
in mind, the various rationales for permitting preferences at common law
are more easily understood. Against this background, the article will exam-
ine the significant Virginia cases dealing with the question of whether a
particular transfer should be characterized as a preference or a fraudulent
conveyance. Finally, attention will be given to the special case in which a
controlling director prefers himself over the debtor's other creditors.
I.
A careful consideration of the policies underlying the law of fraudulent
conveyances and preferences reveals the essential differences between the
two.7 Of the two concepts the fraudulent conveyance is always considered
the more serious since it involves an element of moral turpitude not present
in a preference.' The purpose of the law of fraudulent conveyances is to
assist creditors, both individually and collectively, in realizing on their
debts from the assets of a debtor.' To carry out this purpose, the law of
fraudulent conveyances declares void all transfers by a debtor which un-
fairly diminish his estate to the prejudice of his creditors. Unfairness in
this context has been defined as follows:
Unfairness is present (a) when there is a deliberate intention that
a particular creditor or group of creditors shall not be paid; and
(b) when the debtor has, with or without such intention, gratui-
tously disposed of so much of his property that he has not enough
left to pay his debts.10
This definition of unfairness is embodied in all fraudulent conveyance
statutes." The Virginia statutes serve as illustrations. Section 55-811 voids
See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 60.3 (14th ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER].
The United States Supreme Court stated the distinction between preferences and
fraudulent conveyances as follows: "One is inherently and always vicious; the other innocent
and valid, except when made in violation of the express provision of a statute. One is malum
pe se and the other malum prohibitum - and then only to the extent that it is forbidden."
Van Iderstine v. National Discount Co., 227 U.S. 575, 582 (1913).
See generally 1 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES Chapters I-V (Rev.
ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as GLENN]; Radin, Fraudulent Conveyances in California and
the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 27 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 1-3 (1938) [hereinafter cited
as Radini; see also Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to its Creditors, 90 HARv. L.
REv. 505, 506-17 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Clark].
" Radin, supra note 9, at 7. The essence of the fraudulent conveyance, says Professor
Glenn, "is not a thing of form, nor is our inquiry bounded by the technicalities that attach
to the terms 'conveyance' or 'transfer.' The real test of a fraudulent conveyance ... is the
unjust diminution of the debtor's estate." 1 GLENN, supra note 9, at § 195.
1 This conception of unfairness has been incorporated into the two principle operative
sections of the UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT (UFCA). Section 7 provides that:
"[Elvery conveyance made and every obligation incurred with actual intent, as distin-
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all transfers made without consideration by an indebted person when at-
tacked by an existing contract" creditor. While this section goes beyond
(b) above,'" both are founded on the idea that a debtor ought to be just
before he is generous. Section 55-80, which corresponds to (a) above con-
demns all transfers made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors. While the transactions to which section 55-81 applies are com-
paratively clear,'" the courts have been forced to determine on a case by
case basis when section 55-80 may be invoked by an attacking creditor.'"
guished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud either present or future
creditors, is fraudulent as to both present and future creditors." U.F.C.A. § 7; see text
accompanying note 10 supra. This section corresponds with (a) of Radin's definition of unfair-
ness. Section 4 of the UFCA, which corresponds with (b), provides that "[e]very conveyance
made and every obligation incurred by a person who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent
is fraudulent as to creditors without regard to his actual intent if the conveyance is made or
the obligation is incurred without a fair consideration." U.F.C.A. § 4.
" VA. CODE § 55-81 (Repl. Vol. 1974) provides that:
Every gift, conveyance, assignment, transfer or charge which is not upon considera-
tion deemed valuable in law, or which is upon consideration of marriage, shall be
void as to creditors whose debts shall have been contracted at the time it was made,
but shall not, on that account merely, be void as to creditors whose debts shall have
been contracted or as to purchasers who shall have purchased after it was made;
and though it be decreed to be void as to a prior creditor, because voluntary or upon
consideration of marriage, it shall not for that cause be deemed void as to subse-
quent creditors or purchasers.
11 As to the distinction between present existing contract creditors who may sue under
VA. CODE § 55-81 and subsequent or future creditors who may not, see Consolidated Tramway
Co. v. Germania Bank, 121 Va. 331, 93 S.E. 572 (1917). A creditor suing in tort has never
been considered a present creditor until he has reduced his cause of action to judgment. See
generally 1 GLENN, supra note 9, at § 84.
" The Virginia rule embodied in § 55-81 was stated initially in several English decisions
from the mid-nineteenth century, see, e.g., Spirett v. Willos, 46 Eng. Rep. 649, 651 (1865);
Patridge v. Gopp, 27 Eng. Rep. 388, 389 (1758); Townsend v. Windham, 28 Eng. Rep. 1, 7
(1750), and subsequently followed in the United States by Chancellor Kent in Reade v.
Livingston, 3 Johns Ch. 481 (N.Y. 1818). This rule is an extremely harsh one. Theoretically,
it renders every gift by an indebted person conclusively fraudulent if the transaction is
attacked by an existing contract creditor, regardless of any circumstances which indicate good
faith and due regard for the interest of creditors when the gifts are made. Most states refused
to accept this rule, however, opting for the position set forth in section 4 of the UFCA. See 1
GLEN, supra note 9, at §§ 268-270; McLaughlin, Application of the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act, 46 HRv. L. REv. 404, 407-09 (1933). The Virginia Legislature recognized
the difficulty just noted, but incorporated the harsh rule of Reade v. Livingston into § 55-81
nonetheless. See.Morriss v. Bronson, 170 Va. 516, 197 S.E. 497 (1938). See also Note, 25 VA.
L. REv. 862 (1939).
15 Under VA. CODE § 55-81 the question is whether the debtor was indebted to the creditor
when the conveyance was made. If the debtor was indebted, any transfer without considera-
tion is a fraudulent conveyance. In contrast, under UFCA § 4, if the conveyance rendered
the debtor insolvent or was made while the debtor was insolvent without due consideration,
it is deemed a fraudulent conveyance. Under both sections the issue of whether the debtor
received fair consideration would often be an issue subject to litigation.
", The focus of VA. CODE § 55-80 and similar statutes is on the word "defraud." That a
creditor has been hindered or delayed merely amplifies the idea underlying the boncept of
fraud. When a court, such as the Virginia Supreme Court, states that each word - hinder,
delay, and defraud - has a separate meaning under the statute, the court is recognizing that
19791
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Speaking broadly, the courts have found statutes like section 55-80 applic-
able to two types of transactions. The more common type deals with trans-
fers by which the debtor attempts to defeat completely the claims of his
creditors and gain an advantage for himself at the same time. 17 Two clear
examples come to mind. The debtor sells his principal assets for cash with
the intent to flee the jurisdiction," or the debtor makes a payment on a
valid obligation with the understanding that the grantee will hold the
payment in secret trust for him. 9 In the second type of transaction the
debtor does not attempt to defeat his creditors' claims completely, but
rather to create impediments which hinder or delay creditors in exercising
their remedies.2 0 For example, if the debtor exchanges his only liquid asset,
such as stock, for illiquid assets for the purpose of making it more difficult
for the creditors to realize on his assets, his intent is fraudulent under
section 55-80.
The remedy available to a creditor under these statutes must be
stressed at this point. All states confer upon a judgment creditor the right
to attack a fraudulent conveyance." In addition, most states, including
Virginia,2 permit nonjudgment creditors to assail such transfers.2 If the
fraud can take many forms. Cf. Klein v. Rossi, 251 F. Supp. 1, 2 (E.D.N.Y. 1966) ("hinder"
and "delay" distinct from "defraud").
11 A conveyance is fraudulent under VA. CoDE § 55-80 if made with actual intent on the
part of the grantor to defraud creditors. Such a conveyance may not be set aside, how- -, if
made to a bona fide purchaser. See, e.g., Bruce v. Dean, 149 Va. 39, 140 S.E. 277 (1929), Note,
The Law of Fraudulent Conveyances in North Carolina: An Analysis and Comparison with
the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 50 N.C. L. REv. 873, 889 (1972). The Bankruptcy
Act makes the same distinction. Section 67(d)(2)(d) declares void a transfer made with actual
intent to defraud creditors, but section 67(d)(6) protects a bona fide purchaser in such a
transfer from attack by the trustee in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Act §§ 67(d)(2)(d), 67(d)(6),
11 U.S.C. §§ 107(d)(2)(d), 107(d)(6) (1976).
" See, e.g., Crowder v. Crowder, 125 Va. 80, 99 S.E. 746 (1919).
" See, e.g., Irby v. Gardner, 157 Va. 132, 160 S.E. 81 (1931); Neff v. Edwards, 148 Va.
619, 139 S.E. 291 (1927). See also 1 GLENN, supra note 9, at § 229c. As is the case in most
jurisdictions, the majority of Virginia decisions involving fraudulent conveyances concern
fraud in intra-family transactions. See text accompanying notes 50-67 infra.
21 Clark, supra note 9, at 512; see, e.g., Klein v. Rossi, 251 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
Consolidated Tramway Co. v. Germania Bank, 121 Va. 331, 93 S.E. 572 (1917); Young v.
Willis, 82 Va. 291 (1886) (unreasonable postponement which hinders creditors).
21 The original statute of fraudulent conveyances did not state the procedure to be used
by a creditor in attacking a fraudulent conveyance. In fact, the English statute was a criminal
statute and provided no civil remedy. Yet, the English Courts in Mannocke's Case, 3 Dyer
294 (1571), permitted a judgment creditor a remedy under the statute by permitting him to
levy execution on property. The history of this transition is set forth in 1 GLENN, supra note
9, at §§ 58-62. This right of the judgment creditor to attack the fraudulent conveyance was
accepted in the United States as part of the common law. See, e.g., Van Hensen v. Radcliff,
17 N.Y. 580, 582-83 (1858).
21 The Virginia rule, prior to the passage of VA. CODE § 55-82, see note 23 infra, required
that a creditor have a judgment and execution returned nulla bona as a condition of maintain-
ing a creditor's suit to avoid a fraudulent transfer. Tate v. Liggat & Matthews, 29 Va. (2
Leigh) 84, 90-91 (1830). See generally 1 GLENN, supra note 9, at Chap. VIIA.
2 Under VA. CODE § 55-82 (Repl. Vol. 1974):
[al creditor before obtaining a judgment or decree for his claim may, whether such
claim be due and payable or not, institute any suit which he might institute after
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creditor is successful, the property which was the subject matter of the
fraudulent conveyance may be sold to satisfy his underlying claim.2 Thus,
a creditor who successfully attacks a transfer as a fraudulent conveyance
may set the transfer aside and gain a priority over unsecured creditors on
the property involved.2
"The preference," Professor Glenn observes, "materially differs from
the fraudulent conveyance, because it sins, not against the single creditor's
right of realization, but only against the collective right of the creditors as
a class, that arises when the debtor becomes insolvent. '2 The vice of such
a transaction is that it treats creditors similarly situated differently. When
an insolvent debtor pays off one unsecured creditor as opposed to another,
he reduces his total assets and thereby shifts the risk of nonpayment from
the favored party to the other creditor. In short, the preference constitutes
an infraction of the policy favoring the equal distribution of a debtor's
assets among creditors.
Although a preferential transfer might be regarded as unfair, it is not
the kind of unfairness condemned by the law of fraudulent conveyances.
The most vivid way to distinguish the two types of transactions is to note
their different effects on a debtor's balance sheet. To be deemed fair under
the law of fraudulent conveyances, a debtor must receive assets of value
equal to those transferred. When this occurs, creditors are not prejudiced
since they may satisfy their claims out of the assets the debtor received
from the grantee. An unfair conveyance, on the other hand, is one in which
the debtor fails to receive adequate consideration for the assets trans-
ferred." Such a transaction results in an unjust diminution of the debtor's
obtaining such judgment or decree to avoid a gift, conveyance, assignment or trans-
fer of ... the estate that his debtor declared void by either of the two preceding
sections (§§ 55-80, 55-81) and he may in such suit have all the relief in respect to
such estate to which he would be entitled after obtaining a judgment or decree for
the claim which he may be entitled to recover.
Section 10 of the UFCA provides a similar remedy. However, most states which have not
adopted the UFCA have enacted legislation similar to VA. CODE § 55-82. For a further discus-
sion of such statutes, see RESENFELD, CREDrORs RaS iqmms AND DEBTOR PROTECrONS 365 (2d
ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as RImsmEL].
24 In many states, a judgment creditor may have property subject to a fraudulent convey-
ance sold without first upsetting the conveyance. Section 9(1)(b) of the UFCA provides that
such a creditor may "disregard the conveyance and attach or levy execution on the property
conveyed." Similar procedures may be employed in a non-UFCA state. See, e.g., Wagner v.
Law, 3 Wash. 500, 28 P. 1109 (1892). The property involved may be real or personal.
In Virginia, however, this remedy may not be employed with regard to real property. To
sell land, a creditor must first upset the fraudulent transfer. Thereafter the land may be sold
in satisfaction of the creditor's judgment. See 1 GLENN, supra note 9, at § 121.
21 Initially, all general creditors of the debtor stand on equal footing. All have a claim
against the debtor's assets. By obtaining a lien on the property, a creditor gains a specific
interest in such property and may have it sold to satisfy his claim. In this sense, a creditor
who upsets a fraudulent conveyance and acquires a lien on the debtor's property obtains a
preference over all other general creditors.
" 1 GLENN, supra note 9, at § 1; see 3 CoLuLn, supra note 7, at § 60.03. See also Palmer
v. Clay Prod. Co., 297 U.S. 227 (1936).
27 This is just another way of saying that past consideration is the good consideration
1979]
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estate. The preference involves an exchange of equal values; the debtor
uses current assets to pay off an antecedent debt. Since past consideration
has long been regarded as adequate consideration, such an exchange of
equal values demonstrates fairness to creditors under the law of fraudulent
conveyances." True the preferred creditor is better off than other creditors
similarly situated, but no policy of fraudulent conveyance law has been
offended. The purpose of that body of law has never been to require a
debtor to treat creditors evenhandedly.
29
There is a second, perhaps more significant, basis for refusing to char-
acterize a preference as a fraudulent conveyance. To prevent the unequal
treatment of creditors as a group caused by a preference, a system for
complete distribution of the debtor's assets, such as bankruptcy, is neces-
sary.2 Only the use of such a system can assure equal distribution among
required by all statutes prohibiting fraudulent conveyances which are based on the statute
of Elizabeth including § 55-80. Such has been the established rule for over a century.
Where creditors take no specific security from their debtor, they trust him upon the
general credit of his property and a confidence that it will not be diminished to their
prejudice. They have, therefore, an equitable interest in it which the law, under
certain circumstances, recognizes and enforces. The statute is founded upon the
principle of protecting this equitable right. When a transfer, however, is made to a
creditor, his equity is the same as that of the others, and he is entitled to the benefit
of the universal rule, that where equities are equal, the legal title must prevail. An
existing indebtedness is, therefore, a good consideration in the proviso which saves
the rights of bona fide purchasers. There being no equity prior to that of the vendee,
the necessity which calls for a new consideration in other cases does not exist.
BUMP, FaAuDuLENr CONVEYANCFS 179 (3d ed. 1882) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter cited
as Bump]. This rule was accepted by the draftsman of the UFCA. See McLaughlin, supra
note 14, at 412 where the author states:
In accordance with the Act satisfaction of an antecedent debt has been duly recog-
nized as fair consideration. It necessarily follows that preferences are not bad unless
invalidated by some law other than the Uniform Act.
11 When a preferential transfer is made, the unfavored creditors lose as a group. The
assets paid to the preferred creditor are put beyond their reach, and the satisfaction of an
antecedent debt does not replace assets which have been paid to satisfy such a debt. This
explains why statutes prohibiting preferences benefit creditors as a group.
29 2 GLEN, supra note 9, at § 376; J. MAcLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY § 247 (1956) [hereinafter
cited as MAcLACHLAN]. MacLachlan has described the law of preferences as the most signifi-
cant contribution to commercial law. He states that "the most significant effect of the law of
preferences is not the value of the assets recovered in bankruptcy, but the weakening of the
inducements to negotiate preferential arrangements with insolvent debtors." At the same
time it promotes equitable distributions among creditors. Id. See also Clark, supra note 9, at
511-12 n.21.
1 1 GLENN, supra note 9, at § 289. The need for a system of distribution has been
eloquently asserted by Professor Bump:
Creditors generally trust a debtor upon the faith of his property, and look to it for
payment. Their means, moreover, contribute equally to the fund with which it is
acquired. They therefore have an equally equitable claim for remuneration out of
it. The abstract principles of natural justice dictate that it should be applied for
the equal benefit of all creditors, but this has been found impracticable without the
aid of some artificial system. If the right to give a preference were to be denied while
an insolvent debtor retains his property in his own hands, he could not pay any-
body, for whoever he paid would receive a preference. Such a principle would take
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creditors. Most creditors' remedies, including the fraudulent conveyance
laws, may be used by individual creditors for their exclusive benefit. If
these could be employed to set aside a preference, the court would face an
insoluble remedial problem. As stated in one recent decision:
True, a creditor who collects from an insolvent debtor fares better
than other claimants. Yet, if the transfer were set aside in favor of
another creditor, there would be but a substitution of one prefer-
ence for another. For that reason a preference cannot be undone
by a competing creditor whether the preference was obtained
through judicial process or by a transfer from the debtor .... 11
An example using the Virginia statutes illustrates the point. A creditor
who attacks a conveyance as fraudulent under section 55-80.2 may initiate
his action with either a general or special 4 creditor's bill.5 If a general
away a man's rights over his own property, and involve the necessity of vesting an
inquisitorial power somewhere. The common law had no means or device to form
such a power or to execute such a principle. It therefore adopted an altogether
different set of principles.
Bump, supra note 27, at 179-80.
2, Smith v. Whitman, 39 N.J. 397, 402, 189 A.2d 15, 18 (1963).
32 In Virginia, a judgment creditor attacks a fraudulent conveyance by means of a
judgment creditors bill. Section 55-82 gives the creditor without a judgment the right to
attack such a transfer. See LIma, EqurrY PLADING IN PRACTMCE §§ 412-422 (Mead ed., 1952)
[hereinafter cited as LHE].
VA. CODE § 55-82 (Repl. Vol. 1974). According to Professor Lile:
Where the bill is ... filed on behalf of the plaintiff and others who may come in,
it is known as a general creditors' bill. But although filed on behalf of the plaintiffs
only, if it appears that there are other creditors who are entitled to enforce specific
charges upon the subject matter, they will be permitted, and sometimes required,
to come into the suit, which will then, so far as that proceeding is concerned, be
treated as a general creditors' bill.
The reason for thus sanctioning the assertion of diverse claims in the same suit, in
apparent violation of the strict and salutary rule of equity pleading that bills must
not be multifarious - tantamount to a misjoinder at law - is, not that such a
proceeding obviates a multiplicity of suits (as we are apt erroneously to assume)
but that it enables the court completely to administer the assets or estate against
which the proceeding is directed; and hence all who are entitled to share in the
distribution are proper, and in many instances necessary, parties to the suit.
LuNE, supra note 32, at § 424 (emphasis in original). See also Note, Enforcement of Creditor's
Rights, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 424, 438.
11 A special-creditor's suit may be filed by a single creditor for his own benefit or several
creditors may unite in the same bill. In the latter case, the several creditors may unite even
though their claims against the debtor are separate, so long as they attempt to charge the
same part of the debtor's estate. See TALE, supra note 32, at § 423.
The ordinary common law remedies of writ of levari facias for a levy on real property
or a writ of fieri facias for a levy on tangible personal property, were of no aid to a judgment
creditor in satisfying his claim. First, such writs would not entitle a creditor to reach a
debtor's tangible property such as choses in action and insurance policies. Second, a debtor's
equitable interests such as property held in trust or the debtor's interest as a vendee of a
contract of purchase of'real property would be beyond the reach of these writs. Thiird, prop-
erty which had been fraudulently conveyed could not be reached. To reach such property,
the Court of Chancery provided a remedy in the form of a creditor's bill. However, since it
1979]
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creditor's bill is used, all creditors of the debtor have a right to a pro rata
share in the assets returned to the estate. Use of this procedure does not
give rise to a preference. In contrast, a creditor bringing a special creditor's
suit may obtain a lien on the property recaptured and acquire priority over
all other creditors of the debtor as to that property." Thus, a holding that
a preference constituted a fraudulent conveyance necessarily would allow
an attacking creditor to obtain a preference by suing in his own interest
rather than as representative of the debtor's creditors generally. Such a
holding also would mean that the insolvent debtor could never pay any of
his creditors without violating the law of fraudulent conveyances;
II.
In concluding that preferences are valid when attacked as fraudulent
conveyances, the courts, including Virginia's, have generally relied on
principles different from those set out above. Most decisions upholding
preferences were sustained on the ground that the right to prefer was a
necessary consequence of ownership." The mere existence of a debt did not
create in the creditor any interest in his debtor's property. As the courts
often stated, the debtor did not hold his assets as a trustee for his credi-
tors.3 Until a lien was obtained on the assets, the debtor, in the absence
of fraud, could dispose of them as he saw fit. If he chose to favor one
creditor over another, such was his right. 9 Dovetailing nicely with this
rationale was the theory that the law should reward the diligent creditor
who obtained a lien on his debtor's assets ahead of other creditors." In fact,
creditors' remedies are still structured in such a way that a creditor who
had long been held that equity acted only when legal remedies were inadequate, it was
incumbent on the creditor seeking a creditor's bill to plead the inadequacy of the legal
remedies. For a summary of the early common law developments, see Clark, Receivers at the
Imstance of Judgment Creditors and Priorities Incident Thereto, 17 VA. L. REv. 45 (1930);
Riesenfeld, Collection of Money Judgments in American Law-A Historical Inventory and a
Prospectus, 42 IowA L. REv. 155 (1960). As to the general nature and scope of creditor's bills
in Virginia, see LME supra note 32, at §§ 417-444.
-u This analysis assumes that there are no prior liens on the property. Special note should
be taken of the Virginia rule that a judgment lien attaches to realty fraudulently conveyed.
Matney v. Combs, 171 Va. 244, 198 S.E. 469 (1938). Thus, if a creditor dockets a judgment
on real estate subject to the fraudulent conveyance, priority will date from the time of
docketing. If a second creditor subsequently upsets the fraudulent conveyance, the creditor
with the earlier date of docketing would have priority. See 1 GLENN, supra note 9, at § 121.
:n E.g., Young v. Willis, 82 Va. 291 (1886). In Young, the court stated that "[Tihe right
to prefer one creditor or another results from the ownership of the property and the unre-
stricted power of alienation. The debtor, if no lien has attached, can sell it or transfer it to
any creditor or purchaser, and apply the proceeds to any creditor he may desire. Id.
at 298.
38 See generally 1 GLENN, supra note 9, at §§ 9-11; Marsh v. Kay, 168 N.Y. 196, 61 N.E.
177 (1901).
See BUMP, supra note 27, at 180.
" See, e.g., Planters Bank of Farmville v. Whittle, 78 Va. 737 (1884); Johnson v. Lucas,
103 Va. 36, 48 S.E. 497 (1904). For a comment arguing that the race of diligence theory is
the basis for the Virginia position on preferences, see Note, 21 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 353
(1964) [hereinafter cited as WASH. & LEE Note].
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fears that his debtor will have inadequate resources to pay his claim is
required by law to engage in a race of diligence, since the creditor who
wins the race obtains a preference.41 Thus, the sanction of this race for
preferences through statutory procedures implies an endorsement of the
consensual preference.2
In arriving at this conclusion courts have recognized that the effect of
every preference is to hinder incidentally and delay creditors.43 Whenever
an insolvent debtor prefers one of his creditors, he necessarily puts his cash
or other assets beyond the reach of execution." Does mere knowledge by
the debtor of this inherent. effect show that he intended to defraud his
creditors? The universal answer to this question is no.45 Without any other
design injurious to creditors beyond that implied in favoring one creditor
over others, the intent to prefer does not show fraud under statutes similar
to section 55-80.11 This proposition necessarily inheres in the general rule
that preferences are not fraudulent conveyances.
" For example, the first creditor to docket a judgment lien against his debtor's real
property obtains priority over other creditors. VA. CODE §§ 8.01-458 to 459 (Repl. Vol. 1977).,
Similarly, the first creditor to have the sheriff levy his writ of execution on the debtor's
personal property is ahead of other creditors. Id. at § 8.01-478. See also id. at § 8.01-488. The
priority rule of first in time is first in right also applies to garnishment, id. at § 8.01-501,
attachment, id. at §§ 8.01-548 & 8.01-268, and fraudulent conveyances. See note 34 supra.
In his hornbook on bankruptcy, Professor MacLachlan, aptly describes the common law
system of collection by execution as "grab law." MAcLAcHLAN, supra note 29, at § 5.
42 Section 67(a) of the Bankruptcy Act discourages the race of diligence to a certain
extent, providing in part:
Every lien against the property of [the bankrupt] obtained by attachment, judg-
ment, levy, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding within four months
before the filing of a petition initiating a proceeding under this title by or against
[the bankrupt] shall be deemed null and void (a) if at the time when such lien
was obtained [the bankrupt] was insolvent or (b) such lien was sought and permit-
ted in fraud of the provisions of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1976). No section of the new Bankruptcy Act specifically focuses on
judicial liens. It appears that such liens will be attacked as preferences. See Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 547,92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C.
§ 547). As Collier points out, a judicial lien is simply one form of preference. 4 CoLLIER, supra
note 7, at § 67.
See generally I GLENN, supra note 9, at § 289a.
The Virginia Supreme Court has recognized that, "[e]very preferential payment must
to some extent hinder and delay creditors, but is not necessarily a fraudulent conveyance."
Surratt v. Eskridge, 131 Va. 325, 107 S.E. 677 (1921).
Bump clearly indicates that this is the common law rule. BUMP, supra note 27, at 187-
88. In Shelley v. Boothe, 73 Mo. 74 (1880), the court- forcefully stated the point:
The right of a debtor to prefer one creditor over another necessarily implies the right
of such creditor to accept such preference. While the effect of such preference must,
to the extent that it is made, necessarily be to defer or to hinder or delay other
creditors, the mere knowledge of the preferred creditor that such will be its effect, '
and the debtor intended it should have that effect, will not be sufficient to avoid
the transaction as to a creditor preferred.
Id. at 77. See also 4 ComR, supra note 7, at § 67.42.
11 The Second Circuit stated this proposition as~follows:
It is difficult to imagine a preferential transfer which does'not incidentally hinder
and delay creditors, for, whenever an insolvent debtor pays one of his creditors in
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II.
There are two elements which a creditor must prove to challenge suc-
cessfully a transaction under section 55-80. First, he must show that the
grantor possessed fraudulent intent. 7 Second, if the grantee proves he paid
valuable consideration for the transfer, the creditor must show that the
grantee was a party to the fraud." Stated a little differently, a bona fide
purchaser may retain the transferred property despite the guilty intent of
his grantor." The reason for permitting this defense is obvious. As noted
above, a debtor does not hold his property in trust for his creditors. Until
a creditor obtains a lien on a particular asset, he has no interest in it. All
that he can require under the fraudulent conveyance laws is that the
debtor not unfairly diminish his estate. Therefore, as long as the debtor
exchanges property for assets of equal value and the grantee is not privy
to a wrongful purpose of his grantor, the creditors cannot complain. 0
The manner in which these two elements of proof come into play under
section 55-80 is well illustrated by the many Virginia decisions involving
preferential payments by one family member to another. The case of Irby
v. Gardner" is a good example. In Irby, a mother gave a preference to her
son. 52 Just prior to the transfer, she allegedly declared that she would give
away her property rather than permit her creditors to reach it. After the
conveyance the son allowed his mother to live rent free on the property.
In reversing the lower court's decree in favor of the creditor, the supreme
court noted that while such exchanges are viewed with suspicion, the law
does not preclude close relatives from dealing with one another. 53 Any
full he thereby puts the cash or property so used beyond the reach of execution by
the others. Pro tanto every preference hinders and delays them. If the debtor is
aware that it will necessarily have that result, the transfer would seem to be made
with an intent to hinder, delay, and defraud the other creditors; yet the securing
or paying of an actual debt, in good faith, without any design injurious to creditors
beyond that implied in giving the preference, was not deemed a fraudulent convey-
ance under the principles of the common law and the statute of Elizabeth.
Irving Trust Co. v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 65 F.2d 409, 410 (2d Cir. 1933).
" See, e.g., In re Decker, 295 F. Supp. 501 (W.D. Va. 1969); Hutchenson v. Savings Bank,
129 Va. 281, 105 S.E. 677 (1921); Flook v. Armentrout, 100 Va. 638, 42 S.E. 686 (1902); cf.
Catron v. Bostic, 123 Va. 355, 96 S.E. 845 (1918)(debtor made transfer which was disadvanta-
geous to himself and creditors but which did not show fraudulent intent).
" Once the grantee has shown the payment of a valuable consideration, then a plaintiff
has the burden of showing that the grantee was a party to or had notice of the fraud. In this
context, notice must be "so strong and clear as to fix upon the grantee the imputation of mala
tides." Bruce v. Dean, 149 Va. 39, 51, 140 S.E. 277, 282 (1927). See also Hutchenson v. Savings
Bank, 129 Va. 281, 105 S.E. 677 (1921); Flook v. Armentrout, 100 Va. 638, 42 S.E. 686 (1902);
Garland v. Rives, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 282 (1826).
" See VA. CODE § 55-80 (Repl. Vol. 1974); Bryan v. Jackson, 178 Va. 123, 16 S.E.2d 366
(1941); Morriss v. Bronson, 170 Va. 516, 197 S.E. 479 (1938).
"' See generally 1 GLENN, supra note 9, at § 275; text accompanying notes 28-30 & 43-46
supra.
157 Va. 132, 160 S.E. 81 (1931).
52 Id. at 135-36, 160 S.E.at 82-83.
"' Id. at 143, 160 S.E. at 85. The general rule is that a family relationship alone does not
constitute sufficient evidence of fraud to take a case to the jury, Bank of Pochantas v. Ferrner,
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suspicions raised by the relationship of the parties was overcome when the
son produced extensive documentation demonstrating the existence of the
debt satisfied by the transfer. 4 The most troublesome issue, however, was
raised by the mother's statement of her purpose in transferring the prop-
erty. The court gave a twofold answer to the creditor on this point. First,
it relied on language in a previous case in which the court stated that since
"a debtor has the right to pay one creditor in preference to another, so he
may, without the imputation of fraud, secure one creditor to prevent an-
other from gaining an advantage.""5 Through this statement the court
affirmed the general rule that the intent to prefer, notwithstanding the
inherent effect on other creditors, should not be equated with hindering
or delaying creditors within the meaning of section 55-80. Second, even
though it was "conceded" that the mother had the required intent, the
creditor must also prove that the "grantee, if the sale [was] made for a
valuable consideration, had notice of the fraudulent intent of the gran-
tor."56 Since the son had clearly proven the existence of the debt and was
not shown to have had knowledge of his mother's statement, there was
insufficient evidence of fraud on his part. In confronting the argument that
permission by the son allowing his mother to live rent free on the property
evidenced a secret trust, the court responded that the testimony, when
viewed as a whole, indicated that the son accepted the transfer to protect
his position as his mother's creditor, and that allowing the mother to live
thereafter rent free on the land was a normal reaction of a son for an aged
mother.57 In sum, the creditor had not shown the grantee's participation
161 Va. 37, 170 S.E. 591 (1933), although plaintiff's case may be strengthened by showing
this family relationship. Johnson v. Lucas, 103 Va. 36, 48 S.E. 497 (1904). An exception to
this rule exists, however, concerning transfers by an indebted husband to his wife. In the
contest between the husband's creditors and the wife, the burden of proof rests with the wife
to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the transaction was bona fide. Morri-
sette v. Cook and Bernheimer Co., 122 Va. 588, 95 S.E. 449 (1918); Richardson v. Pierce, 105
Va. 628, 54 S.E. 480 (1906). In Bryan v. Jackson, 178 Va. 123, 16 S.E.2d 366 (1941), a wife
was able to convince the court that a transfer to her from her husband was not a fraudulent
conveyance. She ultimately lost the case, however, as the court found the transfer to be
preferential under section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. Id. at 129-30.
5, Compare Irby with Temple v. Jones, Son & Co., 179 Va. 286, 19 S.E.2d 57 (1942). In
Temple, a father paid off a debt he claimed to owe to his son while insolvent with several
suits pending against him. After the creditors presented their claims, neither the father nor
the son could prove the existence of the debt between them. Id. at 294-96. Since the defen-
dants failed to follow normal business practices with regard to the alleged transaction, there
was sufficient evidence to sustain an inference of fraud. In contrast, the son in Irby kept
complete records of the loan transaction between his mother and himself by retaining the
checks which showed the exact amount of the debt. For a similar case in which a relative of
the debtor failed to prove the existence of the debt due to a lack of proper records, see Fowlkes
v. Tucker, 164 Va. 507, 180 S.E. 302 (1935).
" Williams v. Lord & Robinson, 75 Va. 390, 402 (1881).
54 157 Va. at 138-39; see Sanderson v. Bell, 154 Va. 415, 153 S.E. 651 (1930); Johnson v.
Lucas, 103 Va. 36, 48 S.E. 497 (1904); Neff v. Edwards, 148 Va. 616, 139 S.E. 291 (1927);
Lucas Sergeant & Co. v. Clafflin & Co., 76 Va. 269 (1882).
5 Cf. Neff v. Edwards, 148 Va. 616, 139 S.E. 291 (1927). In Neff the grantee permitted
his brother to remain in possession after the property was conveyed to satisfy an antecedent
debt. This fact did not show bad faith on the part of the grantee since he might have allowed
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in the fraud by clear and convincing evidence."
The court's holding in Irby raises one issue crucial to this study: what
is the basis for conceding that the mother possessed fraudulent intent?
Presumably, she had the dual purpose of paying off a debt to her son, as
well as frustrating the efforts of her other creditors. This duality of purpose
seems to be present in most preferential transactions." As noted earlier,
the necessary consequence of giving a preference is to make it more diffi-
cult for creditors to collect their claims. One would assume that when the
court says that the intent to prefer is permissible, the grantor's other
motive is an insufficient basis to characterize the transaction as fraudulent
as a matter of law. Does the analysis change if the mother's sole purpose
was to defraud her creditors by preferring her son? 0 To begin with, only
in an extremely rare case could the creditor prove by "clear and convinc-
ing" evidence"' that this was-the grantor's sole motive. 2 Given the exist-
ence of the bona fide debt and the mother's denial that she ever made the
statement, Irby v. Gardner does not seem to raise this specific situation.3
Yet, assuming such a case could arise, the issue becomes whether a wrong-
ful purpose can convert an otherwise legal act into an illegal one. To extend
this reasoning further, assume that the son knew that his mother's sole
purpose was to frustrate her other creditors by the preference. The transac-
tion ought to be sustained, nonetheless, since the law permits debtors to
"hinder" creditors through preferences." If creditors were allowed to chal-
lenge preferential transfers on the ground that the debtor's sole purpose
was to defraud them, the bright line rule permitting such transactions
would be dimmed since any questionable remark by the debtor would serve
as a ground for attack. 5 Given the inherent consequences of all preferences,
the debtor to stay in possession out of gratitude for giving him the preference. Id. at 626, 139
S.E. at 294.
A reading of the family fraudulent conveyance cases demonstrates, as the court said
in Temple v. James & Son, 179 Va. 286, 19 S.E.2d 57 (1942), that precedent is of little value.
Id. at 298, 19 S.E.2d at 62. The exact facts and the "flavor" of the case are far more important
than precedent in determining whether fraud is present.
See notes 44 & 46 supra.
W For example, suppose the mother said that her sole purpose was to see to it that her
other creditors were not paid and that she decided to pay her son only for this reason. Does
such a statement serve as a sufficient basis for finding fraud? Most courts would say no. See
note 44 supra.
"x To establish fraud, a plaintiff must prove his case by clear and convincing evidence.
Colonial Inv. Co. v. Chevydate Cement Block Co., 194 Va. 454, 73 S.E.2d 419 (1952); McClin-
tock v. Royall, 173 Va. 408, 4 S.E.2d 369 (1939).
12 For an example of a case in which the debtor admitted such an intent, see Elliot v.
Elliot, 365 F. Supp. 450, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
'3 Irby was limited to the issue of whether the son adequately proved the existence of
the obligations owed to him by his mother. The court's concession that the mother possessed
the required fraudulent intent was considered dictum, given that the lower could had found
no intent to defraud on her part as a matter of law. See 157 Va. at 143, 160 S.E. at 85; text
accompanying notes 56-57 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra.
For example, section 4 of the UFCA was passed to provide a bright line rule and relieve
the court of having to look to the common law badges of fraud to determine the factual issue
of intent. See Commission's Prefatory Note to the UFCA.
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ease of administration requires that a mere preference be sustained." Of
course, the creditor could always show that the preference was in fact
something else, such as an attempt to camouflage a secret trust for the
debtor."
IV.
Under the majority rule of Surratt, an insolvent corporation, like an
individual, may grant preferences." Corporate assets are not held in trust
for creditors,"0 nor will the law imply an equitable lien in their favor."0 In
the absence of a statute, a preferred corporate creditor may retain the
payment despite a suit brought by a representative of the other creditors.7
When a corporate debtor makes a preferential transfer to or for the benefit
of a controlling director, however, most courts recognize that the usual rule
validating preferences does not apply. 2 They hold that in a suit brought
by a representative of the debtor's creditors, the director should reim-
burse the corporation for benefits received, since the controlling director
serves as a fiduciary to the other creditors of the corporation. 3 From this
" In a similar view, a debtor, though insolvent, may use cash or other nonexempt prop-
erty to purchase land or personalty which can be claimed as exempt. See 1 GLENN, supra note
9, at § 1973; REISENFELD, supra note 23, at 566. There are exceptions to this general rule,
however, and facts may be presented from which a court may infer the required fraudulent
intent in this situation. Thus, where an insolvent debtor buys goods on credit, sells them and
devotes the proceeds, not to the payment of the purchase price, but to the acquisition of a
homestead, the transaction may be attacked as a fraudulent conveyance. The underlying idea
is that his purpose was to defraud the creditor from the beginning through his plan. See, e.g.,
Stoner v. Walsh, 24 Cal. App. 3d 938, 101 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1972).
0 Buffum v. Peter Barceloux Co., 289 U.S. 227 (1933); Surratt v. Eskridge, 131 Va. 325,
108 S.E. 677 (1921) (dicta). See also 3 COLLIER, supra note 7, at § 60.03; 1 GLENN, supra note
9, at § 289a. A classic example of camouflage involves a preferential transfer for the purpose
of frustrating the policy of the Bankruptcy Act. See Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438 (1917).
15A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PMVATE CORPORATIONS § 7421 (rev. perm.
ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as FLETcHER].
" The common "trust fund theory" is to the contrary. "According to the 'trust fund'
doctrine, the capital stock of a corporation, or the assets of an insolvent corporation represent-
ing its capital stock, is a trust fund for the benefit of creditors of the corporation." 15A
FLETCHER, supra note 68, at § 7369. See generally id. at §§ 7369-7389. The doctrine has been
repudiated in recent times. H. HENN, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusINEss ENTERPRISES § 171
(2d ed. 1970). For the treatment of the doctrine in Virginia, see cases cited in notes 70-71 infra.
1' Beck v. Semones' Adm'r, 145 Va. 429, 134 S.E. 677 (1926); Planters Bank v. Whittle,
78 Va. 737 (1884).
71 Two exceptions to this general rule have been recognized by the Virginia Supreme
Court. See Ashworth v. Hagen Estate, Inc., 165 Va. 151, 181 S.E. 381 (1935); Reid v. Perrow,
136 Va. 449, 118 S.E. 120 (1923).
72 See cases collected at 15A FLETCHER, supra note 68, at §§ 7470, 7476; Regal Ware, Inc.
v. Fidelity Corp., 550 F.2d 934 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977).
1- All of the cases granting creditors a remedy against this type of wrongful conduct
involve suits in which creditors acted collectively. Another theory supporting the majority
view, as stated by Professor Glenn, ". . . is that while the director's obligation is to the
corporation only, yet one of his duties is to do nothing to impair corporate credit, which a
preference tends to do, and that the creditors work out their right through that of the corpora-
tion." 2"GLENN, supra note 9, at § 386. See also Note, 38 HAIv. L. REv. 541 (1925).
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perspective the director has abused his fiduciary position by manipulating
the debtor's funds for his personal gain at the expense of third parties.
Fletcher summarizes this position in the following words:
The denial of the right of directors of an insolvent corporation to
obtain a preference by way of security or payment of debts due
them by the corporation is not as a rule founded upon the trust
fund doctrine, but upon the theory that it is inequitable that a
director, whose position as to knowledge of conditions and power
to act for the corporation gives him an advantage, should be per-
mitted to protect his own claim to the detriment of others at a time
when it is apparent that all the unsecured debts of the corporation
are equally in peril and that all of them cannot be paid.74
While a preference made to a controlling director may be void for this
reason, this rule is not a part of the law of fraudulent conveyances. Many
decisions such as Sutton Manufacturing Co. v. Hutchinson s make this
clear. In Sutton, a director-creditor asserted that he was entitled to retain
a preference he obtained from the corporate debtor. To support his posi-
tion, the director argued that the transfer should not be set aside since it
did not violate the Indiana fraudulent conveyance act. The court re-
sponded that although preferences made without actual fraudulent intent
were valid under the fraudulent conveyance laws, these statutes did not
provide the only remedy to creditors in this situation. The long standing
rule that directors are not permitted to violate their fiduciary obligation
to creditors was a sufficient basis for the court's judgment requiring the
director to surrender the payment."
The Sutton court's distinction seems proper. Nothing in the policy
underlying statutes similar to section 55-80 prohibits this kind of conduct.
The corporate debtor is neither attempting to totally defeat its creditors'
claims nor gain a secret benefit for itself. Although creditors are hindered
by the preference, the hinderance is identical to that which occurs when
any debtor prefers any creditor. One might argue, in a manner similar to
that asserted by the creditor in Irby, that the corporation's sole purpose
was to defeat creditors' claims. This seems unrealistic, however.7 After
all, a corporation can only act through its officers and even if one imputes
the director's intent to the debtor, presumably his primary intent is to be
paid. A purpose to hinder creditors would be secondary, if it existed at all.
The rule prohibiting directors of an insolvent corporation from granting
T' 15A FLETrrCHER, supra note 68, § 7469 at 234.
5 63 F. 496 (7th Cir. 1894).
76 Id. at 501. The Sutton court also relied on the trust fund theory to hold the creditor
liable. The court stated that an equitable lien attached to the corporation's assets for the
benefit of all creditors which took priority over the right of the director-creditor. Id. at 502.
While this was an alternative basis for upsetting the transaction, the fact that the trust fund
theory is no longer favored does not lessen the authority of this case as precedent for the
principle set forth in the text. For a decision by the Fourth Circuit illustrating exactly the
same point, see Davis v. Woolf, 147 F.2d 629 (4th Cir. 1945).
See text accompanying notes 63-67 supra.
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themselves preferences applies to at least two common fact patterns. 8 The
first, or Darden7' type, occurs when the corporation pays a debt to its
controlling director ahead of its other creditors. In the second, or Bank of
Commerce"0 type, the debtor prefers a creditor whose obligation is guaran-
teed by a director. Suppose that the obligation in which the director has a
direct interest is $5,000. In the former situation if the corporation does not
prefer the director, he loses $5,000, while in the latter type case if the
corporation does not favor the creditor whose debt the director guaranteed,
the director will lose $5,000. From the director's viewpoint the cases are
identical, although the loss suffered may be more immediate in the former
than the latter.
V.
The law in Virginia with regard to cases in which a corporate debtor
makes a preferential transfer to or for the benefit of its controlling director
is unsettled. The three Virginia cases dealing with this issue are in conflict.
This failure stems from the supreme court's inability to define clearly the
vice of the challenged conduct, namely, the manipulation of the corporate
debtor by the controlling director to gain an advantage for himself over
other creditors. Ironically, however, each decision, when viewed in isola-
tion, is arguably correct.
In the first of three decisions, Planters Bank v. Whittle,5' the court
viewed the case as involving no more than a simple preference. In Planters
Bank, some.of the .directors of the debtor were secondarily liable on several
of the corporation's notes held by the Planters Bank. The corporation had
agreed to indemnify the directors if they were called upon to pay the
notes.2 While the two suits were pending against the corporation by other
creditors, the debtor paid off Planters Bank. 3 Thereafter, those creditors
brought suit against Planters Bank charging that the payments it had
accepted were fraudulent and therefore void. The directors were not joined
as defendants. The plaintiff creditors conceded that there was no actual
fraud. Instead, they argued that an insolvent corporation's assets are a
trust fund to be used to pay its debts. Moreover, the diiectors of the
corporation should be regarded by the law as trustees for creditors. From
the plaintiffs' perspective, the directors' duty requires application of the
debtor's assets ratably in paying off its assets to general creditors. This
7" See 15A FLEzCHr, supra note 68, at §§ 7470, 7476.
7' 204 Va. 108, 129 S.E.2d 897 (1963).
" 218 Va. 781, 39 S.E.2d 909 (1978).
" 78 Va. 737 (1884).
' Id. at 738. Under the arrangement, "[t]he Bank discounted for the company four
negotiable notes, upon all of which one or more of the directors of the company were accomo-
dation endorsers - the company agreeing when the endorsements were made to indemnify
the endorsers." Id.
'1 Transfers by a debtor of his principal asset while a suit is pending against him are often
regarded as- "badges of fraud." See, e.g., Philco Fin. Corp. v. Pearson, 335 F. Supp. 33, 40-41
(N.D. Miss. 1971). The plaintiff in Planters Bank, however, did not assert that the transfer
was a fraudulent conveyance.
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duty also precludes the directors from using corporate assets for their own
advantage by preferring themselves as creditors or favoring other creditors
for whose claims they stand as sureties. Therefore, when a director violates
this fiduciary duty to the corporation's creditors, the transaction must be
voided.4 The Virginia Supreme Court emphatically rejected plaintiffs ar-
gument by stating that:
It is not only well settled that the directors may make prefer-
ences between creditors, but such preferences may be made in
their own favor when they themselves are creditors of the corpora-
tion. Of course in such cases they must act with the utmost good
faith, and the transactions to be upheld must be free from the taint
of fraud or suspicion s
In support of its decision, the court cited a number of cases from other
jurisdictions" permitting a creditor-director to obtain a preference over
other creditors of the corporation. Reliance on these precedents indicates
how positive the court in Planters Bank was that self-dealing by directors
giving them an advantage over outsiders was perfectly proper. 7 Particu-
larly revealing is the following argument from one of the cases noted ap-
provingly by the Virginia court." A corporate director has a right to enter
contracts with the corporation, and, if necessary, to use the superior knowl-
edge gained through his position to gain an advantage in the race for the
debtor's assets. Since all creditors know that directors possess this advan-
tage, it is not unfair. Outside creditors assume such a risk. While such
practices have brought corporations into disrepute, the present law does
not prevent such activities. 9
0 In Planters Bank, the court stated:
There is no proof of actual fraud in the transactions involved, but the appellees
[creditors] insist that the assets of an insolvent corporation are a trust fund for
the payment of his debts; that the directors or trustees for the creditors, whose duty
it is to apply the assets ratably for the benefit of the general creditors, and that
therefore they can make no lawful preferences in favor of themselves, or in favor of
those creditors for whose claims they are individually responsible.
78 Va. at 739.
Id. at 740.
Ashurst Appeal, 60 Pa. 290 (1869); Buell v. Buckingham & Co., 16 Iowa 284 (1864);
Whitwell v. Warner, 20 Vt. 425 (1848).
" Stated a little differently, the court did not distinguish the situation in which the
creditor-director received a preference from the situation in which the director stood as surety
for the debt actually paid.
m Buell v. Buckingham, 16 Iowa 284 (1864).
0 More specifically, the Buell court held that:
Being an officer in the corporation did not deprive (the purchaser) of the right to
enter into competition with other creditors and run a race of vigilance with them,
availing himself in the contest, of his superior knowledge and of the advantages of
his position, to obtain security for, or payment of, his debt. Helhas an advantage,
it is true, but it is one which results from his position, and which is known to every
person who deals with and extends credit to a corporation. This is one of the causes
which has operated to bring corporate companies into discredit, and may constitute
a good legislative reason for giving priority to outside creditors. But the legislature
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While today most courts would reject this position and decide the case
differently," the court's holding in Planters Bank seems quite acceptable
in view of the plaintiffs' approach. Plaintiffs' reliance on the trust fund
doctrine seems misplaced, for the majority of jurisdictions had rejected it
at the time Planters Bank was decided." Although the breach of the direc-
tor's fiduciary duty to the creditors was argued,92 the court may not have
recognized this theory since the plaintiff creditors appeared to have fused
it with the trust fund argument. The court merely rejected the rule offered
by the plaintiffs as too broad. 3 Moreover, the directors were not joined as
defendants. The rule condemning a director's breach of fiduciary duty to
creditors requires the director to surrender the amount of the preference.
It is never used against the preferred creditor. 4 Therefore, if the plaintiff
intended to rely on the director's breach of fiduciary duty to him, he failed
to sue the proper party.
In the next decision involving this issue, the court departed radically
from the earlier holding in Planters Bank. In Darden v. George G. Lee Co."5
the controlling director of the debtor corporation, 9 was one of its two
creditors. When it became evident that the company did not have suffi-
cient assets to pay both creditors, Darden assigned all of the company's
assets to himself. The other creditor, George G. Lee Co., 7 asserted that this
must furnish the remedy....
Id. at 291-92.
,0 See, e.g., Darden v. George G. Lee Co., 204 Va. 108, 129 S.E.2d 879 (1964); cases cited
in 15A FLETCHER, supra-note 68, at § 7469. Interestingly, Fletcher cites Darden for the proposi-
tion that preferences to director-creditors are forbidden on the premise that "directors are
fiduciaries and cannot reap any advantage from their position as such." Id. at § 230. As will
be indicated this is not an unreasonable reading of Darden. See text accompanying note 100
infra.
" See 2 GLENN, supra note 9, at §§ 596-598, 602-604; Note, The Present Status of the
Trust Fund Doctrine, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 303 (1908).
' See note 84 supra.
13 See text accompanying note 85 supra. In fact, the court went out of its way to indicate
that there are certain situations in which a corporation's assets are a trust fund for general
creditors. "Much stress is laid by the [creditors] on the case of Sawyer v. Hoag, 84 U.S. (17
Wall.) 610 (1873). In that case, the well established principle was asserted that the capital
stock of a corporation, especially its unpaid subscriptions, is a trust fund for the benefit of
the general creditors, which cannot be withdrawn from their reach by any act or device on
the part of the director. But no such doctrine as is here contended for was there laid down.
On the contrary, the court recognized a distinction between the capital stock of a corporation
and its ordinary assets with which, it was said, the directors may deal as they choose."
Planters Bank v. Whittle, 78 Va. 737, 740 (1884).
', See text accompanying note 101 infra.
'3 204 Va. 108, 129 S.E.2d 897 (1964).
1 Several years prior to the suit the debtor had gone through a creditor's arrangement
at which Darden had acted as its attorney. In this proceeding, Darden advanced the debtor
$25,000 for the purpose of paying off its creditors. In exchange for the advance, Darden took
the debtor's note, received fifty per cent of its common stock, and was elected a director and
secretary-treasurer of the company. Id. at 109, 129 S.E.2d at 898. When it became evident
that the company was so far insolvent that it could not continue, "Darden closed the doors
of the corp6rtion and took the key." Id.
,7 The Lee Company was a large creditor of the debtor's in a prior proceeding under the
Bankruptcy Act. It received forty per cent of its claim in the federal proceeding. After Darden
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transfer constituted a fraudulent conveyance under section 55-80 and de-
manded that the transferred assets be restored to the corporation and
divided ratably between the debtor's two creditors. As one would have
anticipated, Darden claimed that Planters Bank was the controlling pre-
cedent for the case. The Virginia Supreme Court disagreed. The court
stated that the facts were "more in keeping with those in Certain-Teed
Products Corporation v. Wallinger, " a Fourth Circuit case, than Planters
Bank. In both Certain-Teed and in Darden the director controlled the
debtor's affairs, while in Planters Bank the crucial element of control was
not present.9 Thus, the court declared that it would adopt the rule of
Certain-Teed and restated it as follows:
The weight of authority seems to be that the directors of an insol-
took control of the debtor, it Continued to purchase plumbing supplies and materials from
the Lee Comapny.
9- 89 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1937). The Darden court did not set forth the facts of Certain-
Teed. Had this been done, the factual differences in the cases would have been evident. The
defendant, Certain-Teed, owned a subsidiary, Beaver, over which operations were closely
controlled. Id. at 430. Over a lengthy period Certain-Teed loaned substantial sums without
security to Beaver. Nonetheless, Beaver became hopelessly insolvent. Thereafter, the stock-
holders, including the defendant, agreed that the subsidiary be discontinued and its assets
liquidated and distributed to creditors. Shortly thereafter, a state court receiver was ap-
pointed and bankruptcy ensued. Id. at 431. From the time of the stockholder's meeting to a
point shortly before Beaver's adjudication as bankrupt, Certain-Teed accepted a number of
payments on the debt owed to it by Beaver. When Beaver's trustee in bankruptcy attempted
to regain these assets, Certain-Teed defended on the ground that mere ownership of the
majority of Beaver's stock and the existence of common officers and directors did not make
Certain-Teed responsible for Beaver's obligations or create a principal-agent relationship. Id.
at 434. The Fourth Circuit accepted this as a correct statement of the law, but held it
inapplicable to the facts. The court pointed out that Certain-Teed had no right to accept
payments from Beaver after a receiver was appointed, since the law requires that such assets
be distributed among creditors equally. Id. Nor could the defendant accept payments after
Beaver's stockholders directed the cessation of business to ratably pay creditors from the
assets obtained through liquidation. This purpose was frustrated by Certain-Teed's accept-
ance of preferential payments which hindered creditors. Given the close connection of the
defendant to the bankrupt, the Fourth Circuit held that it was proper to infer that Certain-
Teed had ordered such payments be made to it with the knowledge that they were contrary
to the shareholders' resolution to discontinue the business. Thus, the trustee recovered for
wrongful diversion of assets. In effect, the court held that Certain-Teed was a knowing
convertor.
Clearly, the operative facts of Certain-Teed were not present in Darden. The Fourth
Circut condemned Certain-Teed because it accepted preferential transfers after Beaver's
stockholders had voted to liquidate the business and a receiver for Beaver had been ap-
pointed. These two crucial facts were not present in Darden. To a large degree, Certain-Teed
rests on the theory that the parent ordered funds to be diverted to it at a time when it knew
such an act was unauthorized and wrongful. The rule adopted by the Virginia court rests on
a different base. See text accompanying notes 103-04 infra.
This is a questionable reading of Planters Bank. From the apparent facts, the probable
inference is that the directors who acted as guarantors controlled the corporation. See text
accompanying notes 81-84 supra; cf. Beck v. Semones' Adm'r, 145 Va. 429, 134 S.E. 677 (1926)
(director-creditors asked for permission to receive a preference from the debtor's other direc-




vent corporation, who are also creditors of the corporation, have no
right to grant themselves a preference or an advantage over other
creditors in the payment of their claims. This rule is based on
simple justice.'00
Applying this rule, the court ultimately concluded that the assignment
must be set aside, and divided the assets ratably between Darden and
George G. Lee Company.' 1
Undoubtedly the result reached in Darden is correct, but the manner
in which the court employed its new rule seems peculiar. The court noted
that the effect of granting the preference to Darden was to hinder George
G. Lee Company. While every preference hinders creditors, this alone is
insufficient under section 55-80 to upset an assignment to one who pays a
valuable consideration.1 02 If, however, the assignee has notice that the
transfer was made with "intent to hinder," a cause of action is stated under
section 55-80. In the crucial paragraph of the opinion, the court quoted the
trial judge's application of the intent requirement with approval:
The obvious and inevitable effect of this transaction was to delay
and hinder the creditor, Lee Company, from satisfying its claim.
Because of his position, the defendant Darden is chargeable with
that intent. Under Sec. 55-80 of the Code, a conveyance or assign-
ment may be made with intent to hinder or delay, without any
intent absolutely to defraud. Either intent is sufficient. Under such
circumstances there is legal or constructive fraud which renders
the transaction void as to creditors.103
The court then concluded that there was clear evidence proving that Dar-
den was in control of the debtor when the assignment was made, that he
knew what effect the assignment would have, and that such evidence
brought the case within the Certain-Teed rule.0 4
There are probably few instances in which a court has so obviously
strained to fit a square peg-into a round hole. To begin with, the Certain-
Teed rule is not a part of the law of fradulent conveyances: the court's
restatement of it shows that there is no "unfairness" to creditors."' In-
204 Va. at 112, 129 S.E.2d at 897.
, Id. at 113-14; 129 S.E.2d at 898.
to2 See text accompanying notes 43-46 supra.
,, 204 Va. 112, 129 S.E.2d at 897.
, The court agreed with the lower court's finding that:
It appears clear from the evidence that at the time the defendant Darden arranged
for the assignment to himself of the accounts receivable of the Ricks Corporation
that the corporation was insolvent [and] that he knew there were no other assets
out of which the corporation's creditor, Lee Company, could satisfy his claim ....
Id. at 113; 129 S.E.2d at 900.
The conclusions of the lower court on questions of fact in cases where the evidence has
been heard ore tenus are entitled to peculiar weights and considerations, and we should
accept them just as we accept the jury's verdict sustained by evidence which it might have
believed. Id.
115 The question in Certain-Teed was whether the parent should be liable to its subsidi-
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stead, the rule concerns the fiduciary duty of a controlling director to the
corporation's creditors. It is difficult to believe that the court did not
realize this. Certain-Teed was not a fraudulent conveyance case.0 6 Nor are
any of the five cases the court cited in support of its adopted rule. 07 In fact
one of the cases cited was Sutton Manufacturing Co. v. Hutchinson,"'
which, as indicated earlier,'0 ' stated that the director who gave himself a
preference violated the rules regarding fiduciary duties of directors, al-
though such activity was permissible under fraudulent conveyance law.
Why did the court ignore this point? Why didn't it simply condemn
Darden's conduct as a breach of a director's fiduciary duty, correctly citing
Certain-Teed as authority? Apparently the court did not think that the
defendant had raised this issue. Darden defended solely on the basis of
Planters Bank, contending that the decision and rationale stated there
precluded liability being imposed on him."10 Thus, the court's attention
ary's trustee in bankruptcy for diverting assets received from the subsidiary. 89 F.2d at 431-
35; see note 98 supra. In Certain-Teed, the Fourth Circuit addressed the argument of whether
this transfer could be regarded as a simple preference, and found that: "[I]t is no answer to
say that in Virginia, a preferential transfer by an insolvent corporation to a stockholder has
been held permissible in such cases as ... Planters Bank v. Whittle, 78 Va. 737 [1884]...
Beck v. Semones' Adm'r, 145 Va. 429, 134 S.E. 677 [1926] for these cases do not go so far as
to authorize a preference which has been obtained by a creditor in complete control of the
affairs of a corporate debtor. The rule generally prevailing under such circumstances is to the
contrary." 89 F.2d at 435 (emphasis added). One might assume that the Darden court's
subsequent misinterpretation of Planters Bank was based on the Fourth Circuit's misreading
of that case. See note 99 supra.
I" Four cases are cited by the Fourth Circuit in Certain-Teed as authority for the propo-
sition that Certain-Teed had violated its duty to creditors of its subsidiary: Richardson v.
Green, 133 U.S. 30 (1890); Wiggington v. Auburn Wagon Co., 33 F.2d 496 (4th Cir. 1929);
Jackman v. Newbold, 28 F.2d 107 (8th Cir. 1928); Sutton Mfg. Co. v. Hutchinson, 63 F. 496
(7th Cir. 1894). All four are clearly based on the theory that a director of an insolvent
corporation owes a fiduciary duty to general creditors and will not be permitted to gain an
advantage over them in his dealings with the corporation.
I" The Darden court relied on the four cases cited by Darden. In addition, the court cited
Stuart v. Larson, 298 F. 223 (8th Cir. 1924), in whibh the Eighth Circuit expressly followed
Sutton Mfg. Co. v. Hutchinson, 63 F. 496 (7th Cir. 1894). On this basis, Fletcher describes
Darden as being grounded on the rationale "that directors are fiduciaries and cannot reap
any advantage from their position as such." 15A FiLrCHER, supra note 68, § 7468 at 230; see
note 76 supra.
lO 63 F. 496 (7th Cir. 1894).
"7 See notes 74-76 supra.
110 In Darden, the court indicated that two questions had to be resolved:
(1) Is an assignment of accounts receivable by an insolvent corporation to a credi-
tor in partial satisfaction of an antecedent debt avoidable by another creditor as a
fraudulent conveyance in the absence of actual fraud, simply because the assignee-
creditor is a stockholder of the debtor corporation and has previously been an officer
and director?
Darden argues in his brief that the question has been answered by our court where
the issue was "squarely presented in 1884 in Planters Bank v. Whittle, 78 Va. 737."
204 Va. at 111.
(2) Assuming that the lower court has jurisdiction in liquidation of the corportion,
are Lee's rights to estate dividends fixed as of the beginning of the liquidation or
may Lee first receive liquidating dividends of 5% of its claim prior to any dividend
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was never focused on the issue of whether this transaction ought to be
characterized as a fraudulent transfer."' It is also possible that the justices
were of the opinion that their own Rules of Court precluded them from
raising this issue sua sponte. 2 Whatever the explanation, the court's deci-
sion to uphold plaintiff's claim under section 55-80 blurred the line be-
tween a fraudulent conveyance and a preference.
An attempt to explain Darden in terms of the law of fraudulent convey-
ances further demonstrates the confusion. In analyzing transactions under
section 55-80, the two basic issues would seem to be whether the grantor
possessed the requisite intent to defraud his creditors and whether the
grantee qualified as a bona fide purchaser. In dealing with the first, the
nature of the fraud involved necessarily must be defined. Only after a
determination that the grantor was .guilty of some kind of fraud does the
issue of whether the grantee was privy to the fraud become relevant."3 In
the Darden opinion, the court ignored the first issue and focused solely
upon the bona fides of the grantee. It never explained why the corpora-
tion's payments to Darden must be characterized as fraudulent.", By
adopting this technique, however, the court could easily impute the as-
sumed wrongful intent of the debtor to creditor Darden, the debtor's con-
trolling director.
It is not apparent what was "unfair" in the fraudulent conveyance
sense about the corporation's preference to Darden. The court's only refer-
ence to this question was the trial judge's statement that the payment
hindered and delayed the other creditor in satisfying his claim and that
the director knew this. Yet, the Virginia Supreme Court has emphasized
often that while every preferential payment must hinder and delay credi-
tors to some extent, this alone does not convert a preference into a fraudu-
lent conveyance."' One wonders if the court appreciated the significance
of this statement. This is equivalent to saying that the mere intent to
prefer is not fraudulent. To convert a preference into a fraudulent convey-
ance the debtor's purpose must go beyond the simple desire to favor one
creditor over another. Cases such as Irby v. Gardner"6 involving prefer-
ences between close relatives serve to accent this point. If read strictly,
however, Darden points in a new direction, since it holds that the intent
to Darden and then demand that Darden share ratably in dividends thereafter
realized?
204 Va. at 113.
"I Recall that Planters Bank was not a fraudulent conveyance case. The court may have
been of the view that the precise theory employed was unimportant where the correct result
w~s so evident.
IZ See Virginia Supreme Court Rules of Court 5:21. The court has required strict compli-
ance with this rule. See, e.g., Pearsall v. Richmond R & H Authority, 218 Va. 892, 242 S.E.2d
228 (1978); Lacks v. Bottled Gas, 215 Va. 94, 205 S.E.2d 671 (1974).
I" Such 'an approach would seem to be inherent under VA. CODE § 55-80. The statute
first declares void any transfer made with actual fraudulent intent. Thereafter, it provides
that bona fide purchases from a fraudulent grantor are protected. See note 5 supra.
"' See text accompanying notes 102-03 supra.
"' Surratt v. Eskridge, 131 Va. 325, 345, 108 S.E. 677, 683 (1921).
"' 157 Va. 132, 160 S.E. 81 (1931).
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to prefer is fraudulent as a matter of law, and such a transaction may be
set aside under section 55-80 if the preferred creditor knew of this intent."'
The accuracy of this interpretation becomes evident in light of the facts
the court used to demonstrate Darden's bad faith. Darden knew that the
debtor was insolvent and that, if he accepted the assignment, the other
creditor would receive nothing. This knowledge of the corporation's pur-
pose to prefer him is the only evidence relied upon in charging Darden with
"scienter".11 1 Necessarily, this means that the corporation's intent to
prefer was fraudulent under section 55-80. No other basis for finding fraud
is stated in the case.1 19
Yet, this analysis of Darden fails to take into account the court's use
of the Certain-Teed rule. Darden lost not because of his knowledge of the
corporation's fraud, but because he was the debtor's controlling director.
This becomes apparent once one inquires as to the outcome if the debtor
had preferred a controlling director, such as Ames, who knew that the
transfer would prevent George G. Lee Company from collecting any part
of its debt. Since Ames possessed "scienter" in the same sense as Darden,
presumably this transfer to him could be set aside if the scienter element
is crucial. This is not the case, however, for the hypothetical tracks the
facts of Planters Bank, the case that the Darden court carefully distin-
guished.' Thus, Darden's control of the debtor and his misuse of his
fiduciary position, not his knowledge, made the preference wrongful.' Yet,
as noted above, control over the debtor is irrelevant under the law of
fraudulent conveyances.22
The rationale notwithstanding, Darden seemed to indicate a complete
break from the point of view set forth in Planters Bank. After all, the
", 204 Va. at 112-13, 129 S.E.2d at 899-900.
"' Id., 129 S.E.2d at 899-900.
A basis may be possible for a finding of actual fraud. Apparently, Lee & Company
was a long time supplier and creditor of the debtor. See note 97 supra. Possibly, Darden
continued to purchase goods from Lee for the purpose of building up sufficient assets to pay
off the obligation owed to him. If this is true, such intent would be fraudulent. Compare this
situation to the exception to the general rule permitting a debtor to convert nonexempt
property into exempt property. See note 66 supra.
Alternatively the court might have based a theory on the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit
in Bullard v. Aluminum Co. of America, 468 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1972). The creditor accepted a
preferential payment of $23,000 from a known -insolvent corporate debtor in discharge of a
$46,000 debt and released the debtor's president as guarantor of the debt. Although the debt
satisfied was a fair equivalent for the money paid, the court ruled that the transaction was
not in "good faith" as required by 67d(1)(e)(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. 107d(1)(e)(1)
(1976). 468 F.2d at 13-14.
' The Darden court stated that:
[tihe evidence in this case clearly shows that when Darden created the assignment
of the accounts receivable to himself on July 28, 1960, he was in complete control
of the affairs of the Ricks Company so as to bring himself within the rule laid down
in the Certain-Teed Products case rather than our holding in the Planters Bank
case.
204 Va. at 112-13, 129 S.E.2d at 900.
"' See WASH. & LEE Note, supra note 40, at 353.
'1 See text accompanying note 75 supra.
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practice prohibited in Darden was the "disreputable" practice the court
felt powerless to prevent in the earlier decision. 1n While noncontrolling
directors and shareholders might accept preferences, a controlling director
could not be permitted to manipulate the debtor's affairs to his own bene-
fit. Therefore, control over the corporation was the essence of Darden, or
so it appeared until the court decided Bank of Commerce.
The facts in Bank of Commerce1z' were similar in several respects to
those in Planters Bank. While the debtor corporation was insolvent, the
controlling directors authorized payment of debts on which they were sure-
ties to the Peoples Bank. Another creditor brought suit against the corpo-
ration and the controlling directors under section 55-80. The preferred
creditor, Peoples Bank, was not joined as a defendant. The directors de-
murred, arguing that the payment to the Peoples Bank was not a fraudu-
lent conveyance. ' The trial court sustained the demurrer, and the plain-
tiff appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court. The plaintiff conceded that
the preference could not be set aside, but asserted that the directors should
be ordered to "restore" to the debtor the funds misappropriated for their
benefit and that these funds thereafter be distributed ratably among the
corporation's creditors.' Plaintiff relied on Darden, claiming that the ef-
fect of paying a note on which the controlling directors were secondarily
liable was functionally identical to direct payment to the controlling direc-
tors and creditors. The defendants countered with Planters Bank as their
primary authority. They did not seek, of course, to rely on its discarded
rationale,'27 but suggested to the court that Darden and Certain-Teed
could be reconciled with Planters Bank:
The key is that the [preferred] creditor, the assignee, normally is
without knowledge of the intent of the debtor, his assignee [sic].
In the case of the director-creditor, the assignor and the assignee
are one in the same. Therefore the fraudulent intent of the director
is attributable to the creditor, both being the same party and the
1,3 See text accompanying note 89 supra.
1- 218 Va. 781, 239 S.E.2d 909 (1978).
'2 In Bank of Commerce, the defendants also demurred on the ground that the plaintiff
had a "full, adequate, and complete remedy at law or money damages ...... Id. at 782, 239
S.E.2d at 911. While the trial court overruled this basis for a demurrer, the Virginia Supreme
Court did not consider the point.
21 In Bank of Commerce, the creditor did not attempt to set aside the transfer solely for
its own benefit, substituting one preference for another, see text accompanying note 32 supra,
but asked that a "receiver be appointed for the debtor, that the court determine the priorities
of all creditors in the debtor's assets, and that the defendant directors be required to restore
all funds to the debtor which were used for their benefit." Id. at 783, 239 S.E.2d at 911. Thus,
the debtor requested a remedy which would have protected the rights of all the debtor's
creditors similarly situated.
"' See text accompanying notes 97-99 supra. The defendant's counsel recognized this
difficulty. In his brief he said that "[alt first glance it would appear that the language in
Planters Bank and Darden are in irreconcilable conflict. In holding the preference invalid [in
Darden],' however, the court specifically did not overrule Planters Bank . . . which at the
time it could very easily have done, rather it stated 'We find the factual situations in the
instant case and the Planters Bank case to be different."' Brief for Appellees at 5.
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preference may in such case be rightfully adjudged void. This was
the case in both Certain-Teed and Darden. . . .In both Planters
Bank and the instant case, the preference was to a creditor-
assignee without actual notice, the director and creditor not being
one and the same. The fraudulent intent of the transfer is then not
attributable to the assignee and it is as a consequence a valid
preference, following perfectly the theory of fraudulent convey-
ances as it relates to preferential transfers. 
2
1
The supreme court affirmed the trial judge on the basis of the defendants'
argument."' Since the preferred creditor was without "scienter" of the
fraudulent intent of the assignor and exercised no control over the
debtor, 3' "one of the elements vital to plaintiff's cause of action under
Code § 55-80 is lacking, i.e., that the preferred creditor had notice of the
debtor's fraudulent intent."'' Therefore, the complaint failed to state facts
sufficient "to set aside the transfer.'
'3 2
The court's conclusion is rather strange, however, because the plaintiff
did not seek relief in this form. Plaintiff asked that the directors be com-
pelled to reimburse the debtor the amount paid to the preferred creditor;
it did not request that the transfer be set aside. The court ducked the issue
presented by the plaintiff's requested form of relief by focusing on the
scienter of the preferred creditor.'33 The court explained its emphasis on
the scienter issue by stating that this approach "is consistent with the
reasoning employed in other jurisdictions" arriving at the same result on
this issue.'3 1 Yet the authorities cited by the court do not adequately ac-
'1 Id. at 6-8 (emphasis added).
'' In reaching its conclusion, the court stated:
So as we examine the assignee's knowledge of the intent of the debtor-assignor, it
is important to note, as the defendants urge, that in the Darden situation the
debtor-assignor and the creditor-assignee were, in effect, one person; the debtor was
completely controlled by the creditor. Thus, because they were one and the same,
the fraudulent intent of the debtor was ascribed to the creditor, and the preference
was void. But here, as in the Planters Bank situation, the preference was made to
a third-party creditor, the Peoples Bank of Virginia Beach, which exercised no
control whatever over the insolvent corporation of which had no actual or construc-
tive knowledge of the fraudulent intent of the assignor. Thus, one of the elements
vital to the plaintiff's cause of action under Code § 55-80 is lacking, i.e., that the
preferred creditor had notice of the debtor's fraudulent intent.
218 Va. at 787-88, 239 S.E.2d at 914.
'* Id. at 787, 239 S.E.2d at 914.
131 Id. at 787-88, 239 S.E.2d at 914.
12 Id. at 789, 239 S.E.2d at 915.
'3' The court used a similar ploy in Planters Bank, by focusing on the rights of nondefen-
dants, the corporate directors of the debtor.
'' 218 Va. at 788, 239 S.E.2d at 914. The only case the court cited for support on this
point was Rockford Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Standard Grocery & Meat Co., 175 Ill. 89, 51
N.E. 642 (1898). The Virginia court, like the Illinois court in Rockford, protected the directors
on the ground that the favored creditor ought to be able to retain the preference. "On no
principle of law or reason can such creditor be deprived of its right to a preference merely
because the directors guaranteed the debt." 51 N.E. at 643. Neither court notes, however,
that the creditor could keep the preference even if the directors were held liable for the
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count for the determination that the bona fides of the preferred creditor,
who is not a defendant, protect the wrongdoing directors from liability.'1
There is, however, a clear justification for the court's decision- in this
case. Section 55-80 provides that a transfer made with fraudulent intent
may be avoided unless the grantee qualifies as a bona fide purchaser. The
statute provides only one remedy for a violation: the avoidance of the
transfer.'36 The statute does not provide for relief in the form of a money
judgment against one not a party to the transfer. ' If the court in Bank of
Commerce had accepted plaintiff's position that Darden required the relief
requested, the remedies available under section 55-80 would have been
expanded.11' Thus, the demurrer was sustained on the apparent ground
that the plaintiff employed the wrong theory.
If this explanation of Bank of Commerce is accurate, the court's holding
appears sound. The decision simply reflects the difficulties caused by the
confusion of theories evident in Darden. The remedy problem presented in
Bank of Commerce, however, did not exist in Darden. When the fraudulent
transfer was set aside pursuant to section 55-80, Darden, as a defendant
creditor, was ordered to reimburse the estate.' 3 This possibility did not
exist in Bank of Commerce. Yet, the court's result in no way precludes a
plaintiff from ultimately prevailing in a case of this kind. To prevail, an
injured creditor must challenge the transaction in its true form as a breach
of a director's fiduciary duty to creditors and the suit must be brought in
amount of that payment.
The Illinois court was also impressed by the fact that the loan was made and guaranteed
by the directors while the corporation was solvent. Why this is significant is never made clear.
The reasoning of Rockford is criticized in Campbell, Preferences by Insolvent Corporations
to Officers, Directors, or Stockholders, 61 U. PA. L. Rav. 163, 173 (1913).
'" The court cited four treatises dealing with this question. Both 15A FLETCHER, supra
note 68, at § 7476 and 1 GLENN, supra note 9, at § 386, strongly favor the rule requiring'a
corporate director to restore funds to the debtor when he breaches his fiduciary duty to
creditors. The court implied that the contrary position is taken by 19 Am. JUR. 2d
Corporations § 1577 (1965) and P. VAirrmN, THE LAw OF COnORr1ONS IN VRGIN.A § 141(3)
(1929). A reading of § 1577, however, reveals that AM. JuR's editors do not take a position
on this question. More significantly, in § 1574 it is pointed out that the majority of courts
do not permit such a preference. VAwRANN, certainly an obscure authority in comparison
with either FLETCHER or GLENN, merely restates the Virginia rule as set forth in Planters Bank,
the rationale of which the court rejected in Darden.
'' See text accompanying notes 14-21 supra; cf. 1 GLENN, supra note 9, at § 2.
' The law universally has given a remedy for money damages against a fraudulent
grantee for the value of the property that cannot be produced. 1 GLENN, supra note 9, at §§
239-239a. Whether a person not a party to the transfer can be held liable on a tort theory for
participating in a fraudulent conveyance appears highly doubtful. See generally 2 GLENN
supra note 9, at § 74; Note, Tort Liability for Fraudulent Conveyances, 19 STAN. L. REv. 636
(1967).
'1 In effect, the Bank of Commerce court would have held that VA. CODE § 55-80 (Repl.
Vol. 1974) gave rise to a remedy for money damages, presumably sounding in tort.
- Darden v. George G. Lee Co., 204 Va. 108, 129 S.E.2d 897 (1963) was an appeal
involving the liquidation of a debtor corporation. The trial judge decided that Darden and
Lee Company should share in the company's assets pro rata. Id. at 111, 129 S.E.2d at 899.
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the interest of all creditors of the corporation.' 4°
In fact, the court may have given such advice to plaintiff facing this
situation. At one point in the opinion the court emphasized that the result
in Darden turned on the "complete control""' of the debtor maintained by
the director and cited the case of Regal Ware, Inc. v. Fidelity
Corporation,'4 a 1977 Fourth Circuit decision. The facts of Regal Ware and
Bank of Commerce were essentially similar. In Regal Ware, the defendant,
Fidelity, used stock control over the insolvent debtor, Foresight, to give
preferences to two New York banks whose debts Fidelity had guaranteed
and to its wholly owned subsidiary, Fidelity Bankers Life Insurance Co.1
4 3
The Fourth Circuit saw no reason to distinguish these two situations and
held the defendant liable for the amounts paid to the three creditors.'44 The
court relied on Certain-Teed and Darden in holding that a party may not
use its stock control to give itself a preference over other creditors.4 5 The
Virginia court's citation of Regal Ware would seem to indicate that it will
again follow the Fourth Circuit when a Bank of Commerce fact situation
is properly presented so long as the complaining creditor sues the directors
"I Since plaintiff's theory of the case was clearly based on a breach of fiduciary duty,
see text accompanying notes 126-27 supra, one might have expected the supreme court to
overturn the demurrer and remand the case to the trial court for a full hearing. Such an action
would necessitate an explanation by the court of the correct meaning of Darden. After all,
the court misled the plaintiff to a degree in sustaining the action in Darden as a fraudulent
conveyance. It had been anticipated that the Bank of Commerce plaintiffs would sue under
the same statute in essentially a similar case, since in restating the Certain-Teed rule, the
Darden court stated that it was improper for the directors "to grant themselves a preference
or an advantage over other creditors." 204 Va. at 112, 129 S.E.2d at 897.
"1 218 Va. at 787, 239 S.E.2d at 914.
,2 550 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1977).
", Id. at 936-43.
'" In holding the defendant liable, the Fourth Circuit stated that
[H]ere, Fidelity directed the ... assignent of the accounts receivable to a creditor
(Fidelity Bankers Life Insurance Company) and itself for, at least, the purpose of
preferring other creditors whose claims it guaranteed. Fidelity therefore depleted
the assets of Foresight and [another subsidiary] in order to protect itself from
liability on its guarantee to the two New York banks and in order to prefer the
wholly owned subsidiary (Fidelity Bankers Life Insurance Company) to general
unsecured creditors such as Regal Ware.
Id. at 945.
"I The court rejected the defendant's argument that the case fell within the Surratt rule:
Fidelity argues that, absent bankruptcy, it is not legally objectionable for an insol-
vent debtor to prefer some creditors over others, relying on Surratt v. Eskridge, 131
Va. 325, 108 S.E. 677 (1921) and Hutcheson v. Savings Bank of Richmond, 129 Va.
281, 105 S.E. 677 (1921). From that proposition it concludes that even if Foresight
and [another subsidiary] be regarded as a single debtor, they could legitimately
pay the debt to the New York banks even though, by doing so, the assets available
to other creditors were lessened.
Neither of these cases control here. They do not involve the situation which a
parent corporation, which is also a creditor of an insolvent corporation, uses its
stock control to give itself a preference as a creditor. That such cannot be done is





under the proper theory. This seems evident, since it does not seem possi-
ble that the state's highest tribunal would treat differently essentially
similar transactions when such a result could be avoided." Presumably
this accounts for the court's cryptic remark that the complaint does not
set forth facts sufficient "to set aside the transfer."'47
VI.
Undoubtedly, the law in Virginia would have been improved had the
court openly followed Regal Ware, for such an approach would have both
simplified and clarified the law in this area. The court could have stressed
that the evil proscribed in Darden was the controlling director's breach of
fiduciary duty to creditors, and that the rule adopted by Darden and
reaffirmed in Bank of Commerce was limited to such circumstances. Over-
ruling the defendant's demurrer on this ground would have been proper,
even though the Bank of Commerce plaintiff labeled his action as one to
upset a fraudulent conveyance. Since the plaintiff had made his underly-
ing theory clear from the beginning, the defendant would not have been
prejudiced by the court's reinterpretation of its earlier opinion.4 8
Concurrently, the court should have emphasized that the law of fraudu-
lent conveyances was not applicable to these cases, thereby precluding the
possibility that the validity of a simple preference could be questioned.
Recall that Darden apparently held that the intent to prefer by the grantor
is fraudulent. That some members of the bar have read Darden this way
is evident from the argument made by the defendant's counsel in Bank of
Commerce. " This error is reinforced by the court's statement of its scien-
ter approach in Bank of Commerce, for it indicates that the debtor's intent
in preferring Peoples Bank was fraudulent.5" This misinterpretation of
"' In Bank of Commerce, the Virginia Supreme Court assumed the debtor corporation
possessed the required fraudulent intent and that the directors controlled the corporation.
Therefore, following Darden, the court must have believed that the directors' conduct was
wrongful. The only case the court cited in support of its position was Rockford Wholesale
Grocery v. Standard Grocery & Meat Co., 175 Ill. 89, 51 N.E. 652 (1898) which held that such
actions of the directors were acceptable.
218 Va. at 789, 239 S.E.2d at 915.
'" See Brief for Appellant at 4-9. In addition to Darden, counsel relied on Ware v.
Rankin, 97 Ga. App. 837, 104 S.E.2d 555 (1958) and Love Mfg. Co. v. Queen City Mfg. Co.,
74 Miss. 290, 20 So. 146 (1896) which expressly relied on the directors' breach of fiduciary
duty to creditors. Ware is especially clear since it was based on a Georgia statute which
prohibited directors of an insolvent corporation from using remaining assets to gain any kind
of advantage for themselves. 97 Ga. App. at 841, 104 S.E.2d at 559.
"' Throughout his argument the director's counsel assumed that the intent to prefer was
fraudulent and the validity of the preference turned on the assignee's knowledge. While it is
true that counsel also asserted that Darden must be "limited to its facts," Brief for Appellee
at 8, this argument was aimed at distinguishing a Darden type case from a Bank of Commerce
type case. Counsel's entire position was predicated on the view that a preference is bad and
may be set aside, unless the creditor qualifies as a bona fide purchaser. Id.
'I After indicating the fact that preferences necessarily hinder and delay is not sufficient
to set aside *the transfer made to a purchaser for a valuable consideration, the Bank of
Commerce court continued: "it is sufficient . . ., if the assignee ... had notice of the fact
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Virginia law should not have been permitted to continue.
An illustrationoreveals the potential difficulties. Assume that Smith, a
private individual, is hopelessly insolvent. Smith has many creditors, but
he uses all of his assets to pay off the debt of his friend Jones. A judgment
creditor, Barr, wishes to upset the transfer under section 55-80. What must
Barr plead to survive a demurrer? Suppose Barr asserts in his complaint
that Smith, while insolvent, made a preferential transfer to creditor Jones,
thus leaving Smith without assets to pay Barr's judgment. Such allega-
tions are insufficient under Virginia authorities, but the reason for this
insufficiency is stated differently in the cases. Under the traditional rule
set forth in Surratt v. Eskridge,"' Smith has the right to make the prefer-
ential transfer as an incident of ownership as long as preferring Jones is
his only purpose."2 As long as the property is unencumbered, Smith's
creditors have no interest in any asset of the debtor. The transfer also is
valid under Darden's and Bank of Commerce's scienter tests. While the
allegations show a fraudulent transfer, the pleadings do not indicate that
Jones possessed "scienter" i.e., that Jones knew that Smith was insolvent
and intended to make a preferential transfer. Suppose that Barr further
alleges that Jones knew of Smith's insolvency before or at the time of the
transfer. Under the older cases such as Surratt, the transfer is still valid.
Since Smith, as an incident of ownership had the absolute right to make
the transfer, Jones necessarily had the right to receive it. The fact that he
knows other creditors of Smith cannot be paid is irrelevant. 53 The court
in Bank of Commerce cites Surratt with approval, but says that
"[elmbodied within the concept of fraudulent conveyances is the fact that
all preferential transfers necessarily 'hinder and delay' other creditors
.... "I" This in itself is not sufficient to upset the transfer where a bona
fide purchaser (creditor) is involved. The court further states "it is suffi-
cient, however, if the assignee. . . had notice of the fact that the assign-
ment was made with intent to hinder."'5 5 Does Jones's knowledge of
Smith's insolvency put him on notice of his debtor's intent to hinder?
Under the scienter test the answer would seem to be yes. If the preferred
creditor knows the debtor is insolvent, the law will presume he knows that
the debtor can no longer pay off the claims of his other creditors. In
Darden, the court pointed to the director's knowledge of the debtor's insol-
vency as the reason for charging him with the debtor's intent to hinder
other creditors. Bank of Commerce is quite consistent with this interpreta-
that the assignment was made with 'intent to hinder.' Darden v. George G. Lee Co....
So ... we examine the assignee's knowledge of the intent of the debtor-assignor .... 218
Va. at 787, 239 S.E.2d at 914. This goes well beyond those cases which indicate that the intent
to prefer is a badge of fraud and is assumed to be inherent in the transaction. 2 GLENN, supra
note 9, at § 378.
Is 131 Va. 325, 108 S.E. 677 (1921).
152 See text accompanying notes 37 & 45-46 supra.
'1 See note 45 supra.
' 218 Va. at 787, 239 S.E.2d at 914.




tion, for the court sustained such a transfer on 'the ground that the pre-
ferred creditor had no notice of the grantor's wrongful intent. If the pre-
ferred creditor knew of the debtor's insolvency, he would be in possession
of the same facts that director Darden held and presumably suffer the
same fate. Therefore, Barr's additional allegation of insolvency would state
a cause of action against Jones.'56
The court should reject Barr's argument. One clear ground would be
to limit Darden's and Bank of Commerce's scienter test to situations in-
volving benefits granted to controlling directors by a debtor corporation as
against its other creditors. The traditional rule would apply to all other
preference cases. The court, however, fails to state clearly that such dis-
tinction exists.'
If the law of preferences has been modified as indicated, it is submitted
that this is not a change for the better. There are two clear grounds for this
conclusion. First, the "scienter" test that the court would be using seems
to be quite similar to that found in section 60(b) of the current Bankruptcy
Act which prohibits preferential transfers whenever the preferred creditor
has "reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent."'", Section 60(b) has
been criticized on the ground that it is difficult to administer, encourages
1 4 Under the rules set down by the court in Bank of Commerce, a similar problem could
arise in cases in which a corporation pays a debt on which a director is secondarily liable.
For example, suppose that Frick Corp. prefers one of its creditors, Jones, on a debt on which
its controlling director, Smith, is secondarily liable. Should Barr, a creditor of Frick Corp.,
allege any facts in addition to those just noted in his complaint to state a cause of action
under section 55-80 of the Virginia Code? Clearly, if Barr alleges that Jones knew of Frick's
insolvency, the cause of action would be stated for the reasons just noted. Jones would know
that director Smith would be benefitted by the preference. Does this put Jones in possession
of such information as would excite the suspicions of a man of ordinary prudence that this
payment was a preference which hindered other creditors in collecting their claims? Since
this issue was not raised in Bank of Commerce, one cannot be certain how the Virginia
Supreme Court would answer it. Unquestionably, however, creditor Jones would possess
precisely the same kind of information that condemned director Darden.
I" The court says that its "focus on the scienter of the preferred creditor is consistent
with the reasoning employed in other jurisdictions which have sustained the validity of a
preference by an insolvent corporation when a director or officer is endorser, guarantor, or
surety for the debt." 218 Va. at 788, 239 S.E.2d at 915. This might indicate that Darden and
Bank of Commerce are viewed as special applications of the general rules regarding prefer-
ences. Yet in Bank of Commerce the court stated repeatedly that this focus on the bona fides
of the preferred creditor constitutes the starting point of analysis. Id; see Irby v. Gardner,
157 Va. 132, 160 S.E. 81 (1931).
'5 Sections 60(a) and (b) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 96(a), (b) (1976), state
the conditions under which a preference is subject to avoidance of bankruptcy. The elements
of 60(a) are: (1) a transfer as defined in section 1(30), (2) of the property of the debtor; (3) to
or for the benefit of a creditor, (4) for or on account of an antecedent debt, (5) made or suffered
by the debtor while insolvent, (6) within four months prior to the filing of a petition, and (7)
having the effect and enabling the creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than
any other creditor of the same class. Section 60(b) provides:
[ainy such preference may be avoided by the trustee if the creditor receiving it or
to be benefitted thereby or his agent acting with reference thereto has, at the time
when the transfer is made, reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent
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ignorance and poor creditor practices, and penalizes the diligent creditor.',"
For these reasons, the section 60(b) test was omitted from the new Bank-
ruptcy Act.' 0 Second, the scienter test would cause a remedial problem
which has long prevented courts from characterizing preferences as fraudu-
lent conveyances. In the hypothetical case set out above, the court would
be substituting one preference for another by permitting Barr to set aside
the preference to Jones. No doubt the court would avoid this absurd result
when given the opportunity.
Finally, it should be stressed that the total adoption of the Fourth
Circuit's approach set forth in Certain-Teed and Regal Ware effectively
prevents the occurrence of the remedy problem which traditionally de-
terred equity from characterizing preferences such as the substitution of
one preference over another as fraudulent conveyances. Under the Fourth
Circuit's rule only a liquidator or a representative of all creditors may
attack the director's breach of duty to creditors.' 6' If successful, the remedy
granted in such cases is to have the director restore to the corporation
funds of the debtor used for the director's benefit. Thus, this creditor's suit
requires equal distribution among parties similarly situated.
CONCLUSION
While the writer disagrees with the court's decision in Bank of
Commerce on the merits, his principal complaint is that the court in both
this decision and Darden failed to articulate clearly the basis for its deci-
sions. In Darden, the court told us that a preferential transfer by a corpora-
tion to a controlling director-creditor was fraudulent as a matter of law,
although the precise nature of the fraud was not revealed. In Bank of
' The report of the House Judiciary Committee had this to say about 60(b):
[TJhe trustee must show that the creditor for whose benefit the preferential trans-
fer was made had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent at the time
of the transfer.
This provision was designed when the primary purpose of the preference section was
to prevent the race of diligence. Whether or not a creditor knows or believes that
his debtor is sliding into bankruptcy is important if the only purpose of the prefer-
ence section is to deter the race. However, a creditor's state of mind has nothing
whatsoever to do with the policy of equality of distribution, and whether or not he
knows of the debtor's insolvency does little to comfort other creditors similarly
situated who will receive that much less from the debtor's estate as a result of the
prebankruptcy transfer to a preferred creditor. To argue that the creditor's should
not be required to disgorge what they took in supposed innocence is to ignore the
strong bankruptcy policy of equality among creditors. Finally, the requirement that
the trustee prove the state of mind of his opponent is nearly insurmountable and
defeats many preference actions. The amount of litigation it causes is too great
when the requirement itself does not further any necessary bankruptcy policy. It
also defeats the policy of the preference section by limiting the recoveries to only
the most egregious cases. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 178, reprinted
in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws No. 11c, 179, 335.
"0 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 547, 92 Stat. 2549
(1978) (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 547).
"I See generally 2 GLENN, supra note 9, at § 386.
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Commerce, the court sustained a preference because of the bona fides of a
third party, while ignoring the controlling director-defendant's conduct
which was essentially similar to that summarily condemned in Darden.
The court concluded by announcing that the plaintiff was not entitled to
a remedy it did not seek.
As suggested earlier, the court ought to have recognized that situations
involving preferences by corporate debtors to or for the benefit of control-
ling directors differ markedly from preferences generally. The same rules
cannot be made to apply to both without causing confusion. 'Yet, it is
submitted that this is now the state of the law in Virginia.

